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DIVIDED WE FALL: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND
THE LEMON ENTANGLEMENTS PRONG
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN*

ABSTRACT.,

The 2008 campaign for the presidency should remind Americans that mixing religion and politics can be dangerous. Polls show
that more than half of American voters would hesitate to support a
Mormon candidate. In terms of Establishment Clause doctrine, the entanglements prong of the Lemon test provides a mechanismfor protecting political equality by ensuring against religiously-inspiredpolitical
divisiveness. Yet, in recent years, numerous scholars and Supreme
Court Justices have attacked the entanglements prong. Indeed, the
Court has poked so many holes in the entanglements inquiry that it may
no longer exist. This Article defends the political-divisivenesscomponent of the entanglementsprong. The political theory of pluralist democracy, the social science research documenting the power of religious identity, and the history of religious discriminationin the United
States demonstrate that the importation of religious divisions into the
political realm can thwart the pluralist democratic process. Pluralist
democracy demands that each and every citizen be afforded a full and
fair opportunity to participate,to assert his or her interests and values
in the democratic arena. Citizens, then, must be willing to negotiate
and compromise with other citizens, who are equally entitled to assert
their interests and values. But religiously-inspiredpolitical positions
sometimes cannot be compromised; they are absolutes. Moreover,
when political stances form around religious orientations, religious
outsiders inevitably lose merely because they are minorities. Through* Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct
Professor of Political Science, University of Wyoming. I thank Noah Feldman, Rich
Garnett, and Gregory Sisk for their comments on an earlier draft.
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out American history, dominant religious groups have translated their
values into political goals and imposed them on minorities. Given this,
the Court should promote political equality and protect religious minoritiesfrom the ravages wrought by religiously-inspiredpoliticaldivisiveness. To do so, the Court should interpret the Establishment
Clause to proscribegovernmental programsfunding religious activities
and institutionsand governmental displays of religious symbols.
INTRODUCTION

For three decades, conservatives in the United States have
championed a reliance on religious values and dogma in political deliberations.' Yet, historical and current events from around the world illustrate what can happen when religion and politics are combined: they
can make for a volatile mix. In the 1640s, for example, conflict between the Anglican and Catholic-leaning King Charles I and a (Protestant) Puritan-led Parliament catapulted England into civil war (and led
to the King's eventual beheading).2 Today, current events in Iraq demonstrate how political strife engendered by religious divisionsbetween Sunni and Shiite Muslims, in particular-might thwart efforts
to implement democracy. 3 Nonetheless, Americans can too easily dismiss distant events from the past and from other nations. Religion
might hinder democracy elsewhere, but it couldn't happen here--or so,
at least, many Americans apparently believe.
1. See, e.g., BARRY A. KOSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER
GOD: RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY 197-99 (1993); STEPHEN L.
CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (1993); RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED
PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984); Richard John
Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL
ANTHOLOGY 89 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000).
2. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS:

CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
inafter FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T].

A

84-92 (1997) [here-

3. Seymour M. Hersh, The Redirection, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 5, 2007, at 54;
Sabrina Tavernise, Sunni-Shiite Violence Points to Religious War, INT'L HERALD

TRIB., May 28, 2005, § News at 3 http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/27/news/sunn
i.php. For an optimistic assessment of the compatibility of democracy with forms of
Islam, see NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY (2003).
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The campaign for the 2008 presidential nominations, however,
should bring home to Americans why mixing religion and politics can
be dangerous. Mitt Romney, former governor of Massachusetts, carried the conservative credentials that seemed to cast him as an ideal
Republican presidential candidate, but for one flaw. 4 One poll after another revealed that a substantial percentage of Americans and an even
higher percentage of Republicans would hesitate to vote for Romney
solely because of his religion: he is a member of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 5 The Washington Post reported polls
showing that 24 percent of Americans would not vote for a Mormon for
president, while 42 percent of Republicans "would either not vote for a
Mormon or would do so with some level of doubt.' According to an
NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll, a whopping 53 percent of Ameri-

cans "were very uncomfortable or [had] some reservations" about voting for a Mormon presidential candidate. 7
Given these numbers, rival Republican presidential candidate
Mike Huckabee unsurprisingly prodded Republican voters on the campaign trail to remember that he is an ordained Southern Baptist minister, that Romney is Mormon, and that Huckabee is therefore more
trustworthy. With feigned innocence, Huckabee asked, "Don't Mormons believe that Jesus and the devil are brothers? ' 8 In fact, many

4. See Amy Sullivan, Mitt Romney's Evangelical Problem, WASH. MONTHLY,
Sept. 2005, at 13, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2005/0
509.sullivan I.html.
5. Thomas Burr, Poll Shows Romney's Faith Speech Did Little To Sway Mormon-shy Voters, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 12, 2007, Local Politics, available at
http://www.sltrib.com/ci-7698653; Jill Lawrence, Will Mormon Faith Hurt Bid for
White House?, USA TODAY, Mar. 12, 2007, at 10A, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-02-12-romney-cover-x.htm;
Howard Berkes, Faith Could Be Hurdle in Romney's White House Bid, NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO, Feb. 8, 2007, http://www.npr.orgltemplates/story/story.php?storyld=
7245768.
6. Parsing
the
Polls:
Answering
the
Mormon
Question,
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/thefix/2007/02/parsing-the-polls the-mormonq.ht
ml / (Feb. 14, 2007, 5:30 EST).
7. Berkes, supra note 5.
8. Foxnews.com, GOP Hopeful Mike Huckabee Asks if Mormons Believe Jesus, Devil are Brothers, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,316507,00.html (last
visited Feb. 6, 2009).
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evangelical churches teach that Mormonism is an anti-Christian cult
that worships Satan. 9 One televangelist declared, "If you vote for Mitt
Romney, you are voting for Satan!"' 0 Leading up to the Iowa caucuses
on January 3, 2008, Huckabee repeatedly reminded voters that he was
the Christian candidate' 1 and aired commercials proclaiming himself a
"Christian leader."' 12 His strategy apparently helped: he won Iowa,
where3 60 percent of the Republican caucus participants were evangelicals.'
Iowa was just the beginning. At the national level, approximately 26 percent of Americans and 30 percent of Republicans are
evangelical Christians.' 4 Moreover, as reported in the recent Pew Forum Religious Landscape Survey, "[t]he South, by a wide margin, has
the heaviest concentration of members of evangelical Protestant
churches.' 5 Thus, when nearly half the states held primaries and caucuses on Super Tuesday, February 5, 2008, the results were all-toopredictable. As summarized in the Washington Post, "Huckabee domi-

9. Sullivan, supra note 4.
10. Jonathan Chait, Pray Tell, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 19, 2007, at 5, available at
http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=be6da8 1d-7fb 1-414d-b65cf734c7ee07a3&p=l.
11. See generally Rebecca Sinderbrand, New Huckabee Ad Appeals to Christian Conservatives, CNN.com, Jan. 1, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITI
CS/01/01/huckabee.christians/index.html; Michelle Vu, Huckabee Defends Jesus as

Point

of

Christmas,

CHRISTIAN

POST,

Dec.

25,

2007,

http://www.christianpost.com/article/20071225/30638_HuckabeeDefendsJesusas
_Point-ofChristmas.htm; Amy Sullivan, Huckabee's Bid for the Christian Right,
TIME, Oct. 22,2007, http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1674340,00.html.
12. Huckabee
Ad:
I
am
the
True
Christian
Candidate,
http://www.godlikeproductions.com/foruml/message472456/pgl (last visited Feb. 6,
2009).
13. Michael Luo & David D. Kirkpatrick, At Huckabee Central, Cheers for
Evangelical Base, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/04/us
/politics/04repubs.html?_r = 1&oref=slogin.
14. See THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS
LANDSCAPE SURVEY 5 (2008) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY] (reporting that 26.3 percent of Americans belong to evangelical churches),
http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf;
Sullivan,
supra note 4 (reporting percentage of Republicans).
15. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY, supra note 14, at 8; see KOSMIN &
LACHMAN, supra note 1, at 49-55 (discussing geographical distribution of Baptists).
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nated the South,
winning
Arkansas
as well as Georgia, TenAlbaaan
Wsthis native
.
,,16
nessee, Alabama, and West Virginia.
Facing these results, Romney,
the Republican "candidate straight from central casting,"1 7 dropped out
of the race.1
Whether or not we admit it, Americans are "divided by God,"
in the words of Noah Feldman." Religious divisions propel many
Americans into political disputes--over abortion, same-sex marriage,
the death penalty, and a host of other issues. Recent Supreme Court
cases confronting Establishment Clause issues, such as the constitutionality of public displays of the Ten Commandments, "raise the central challenges of citizenship and peoplehood: who belongs here? To
what kind of nation do we belong? ' 20 In terms of democracy, the question becomes one of political equality: who is entitled
to participate as a
21
polity?
American
the
in
status
equal
of
member
With regard to Establishment Clause doctrine, such questions
of belonging-of equal participation in the democratic polity-can be
addressed under the entanglements prong of the Lemon test. In Lemon
.

16. Perry Bacon, Jr., Gamble PaidOfffor Huckabee on Tuesday, WASH. POST,
Feb.
7,
2008,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/O2/O6/AR2008020604125.html?hpid=topnews; see Michael
Kranish, Evangelical Voters Bolster Huckabee in Southern States, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 6, 2008, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/02/06/
evangelical votersbolsterhuckabeeinsouthemstates/ (discussing effect of
evangelical voters).
17. Scott Lehigh, Unpersuasive to the End, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 8, 2008,
available at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editoriaLopinion/oped/articles/
2008/02/08/unpersuasive to the end/.
18. John Sullivan & Michael Luo, Romney Exits, Saying He Has to 'Stand
Aside for Our Party,' N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/us/politics/O7cnd-repubs.html?_r= 1&ref-=us&
oref=slogin.
19. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED By GOD (2005) [hereinafter FELDMAN, DIVIDED].

According to Feldman (for what it's worth, we are not relatives), "[t]he deep divide
in American life.., is not primarily over religious belief or affiliation-it is over the
role that belief should play in the business of politics and government." Id. at 6.
20. Id. at 7.
21. See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the
Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673, 674-93 (2002) [hereinafter Feldman,

From Liberty] (arguing that, after World War II, the Court increasingly interpreted
the Establishment Clause as protecting political equality).
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v. Kurtzman,22 the Supreme Court articulated a three-pronged standard
for resolving Establishment Clause issues. "First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion. ' '' 23 Lemon arose from challenges to two state statutes that provided funding to religious schools for teachers' salaries, books, and
other instructional materials to be used when teaching secular subjects.
Chief Justice Warren Burger's majority opinion reasoned that these
state programs violated the third Lemon prong by generating two impermissible types of governmental entanglements with religion.
One type of entanglement was administrative. When the government supplies money to a religious institution for secular purposes-such as funding for teachers in parochial schools-then the
government will need to monitor the use of the funds to insure that they
are not diverted for religious activities. Such governmental surveillance (and potential control) of a religious institution amounts to un24
constitutional entanglement.
More central to this Article, the second type of impermissible
entanglement arose because the governmental actions were likely to
engender
political divisiveness corresponding with religious differ25
ences. Burger concluded: "The potential for political divisiveness related to religious belief and practice is aggravated in these two statutory
programs by the need for continuing annual appropriations and the like26
lihood of larger and larger demands as costs and populations grow.,
This constitutional protection against religiously inspired political divisiveness provides a doctrinal means for policing against political inequality. When religious differences are translated into political differences, then religious minorities will likely be the losers. They
will be precluded from participating equally in the democratic polity
precisely because their religious beliefs and practices set them apart.

22. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
23. Id. at 612-13 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) and
quoting Waiz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
24. Id. at 614-22.
25. Id. at 622-24.
26. Id. at 623.
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Religious differences will be transformed into diminished political
power-into a reduced capacity to influence political debates. Even so,
despite the apparent importance of the entanglements prong, with its
political divisiveness component, numerous scholars and justices have
attacked it. Most recently, Richard W. Garnett advocated abandoning
the judicial enforcement of the entanglements prong because, he reasoned, the Establishment Clause should not be invoked as a mechanism
to standardize or homogenize the people and their political desires. If
the people politically divide along religious lines, so be it. 2 7 Noah
Feldman has argued that the Court's reliance on the Establishment
Clause to protect political equality both departs from the original purpose of the Clause and leads to untoward doctrinal consequences. 28
The justices, meanwhile, have poked so many holes in the entanglements prong that it may no longer exist.
This Article defends the Lemon entanglements prong, particularly its political divisiveness component. If the Court were to stop
protecting against religiously-inspired political divisiveness, the Court
would contravene the conception of democracy that it has persistently
articulated and developed since the late 1930s. 29 In a pluralist democracy, such as we have in the United States today, the Court should generally ensure that all Americans have a fair and equal opportunity to

27. Richard W. Gamett, Religion, Division, and the FirstAmendment, 94 GEO.
L.J. 1667 (2006); see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE 288-90
(2008) (criticizing the entanglement prong for being excessively vague).
28. According to Noah Feldman, the original purpose of the Establishment
Clause was to protect liberty of conscience. FELDMAN, DIVIDED, supra note 19, at
19-56; See Feldman, From Liberty, supra note 21, at 679-84; see also Noah
Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.

346 (2002). Doctrinally, Feldman argues that the protection of political equality has
led the Court, first, to articulate tenuous distinctions between public and private actions-where the establishment clause limits do not apply to private actions-and,
second, to allow some governmental funding of religious activities if the funding is
supplied equally (or neutrally) to non-religious activities and institutions. Feldman,
From Liberty, supra note 21, at 718-30.

29.
HISTORY

M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
291-382 (2008) [hereinafter FELDMAN, FREE EXPREsSION]; see also

STEPHEN

Stephen M. Feldman, Unenumerated Rights in Different Democratic Regimes, 9 U.
L. 47, 62-98 (2006) [hereinafter Feldman, UnenumeratedRights].

PA. J. CONST.
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participate in the democratic arena.3 ° More specifically, the Court
should implement the Establishment Clause as a mechanism for protecting religious minorities' participatory equality. 3 1 American history
unfortunately provides numerous examples where the religious majority not only has disregarded minorities, slighting their interests and values in democratic deliberations, but also has purposefully persecuted
them.
Part I of this Article reviews Burger's Lemon reasoning on political divisiveness, follows the justices' development of the entanglements prong, and then discusses the Court's recent retreat from the en32
tanglements inquiry. Part II defends the entanglements prong on the
basis of democratic theory, social science research, and American history. 33 Why, precisely, should courts seek to protect against religiously-inspired political divisiveness? Part III identifies types of governmental actions that the entanglements prong should proscribe.34
What governmental actions are likely to generate religiously-inspired
political divisiveness? Part IV, the conclusion, responds to Garnett's
and Noah Feldman's arguments and ends with a coda on religion in the
31
2008 presidential race.
I. LEMON, POLITICAL DIVISIVENESS, AND JUDICIAL RETREAT
A. On Lemon
While Chief Justice Burger explicated a three-pronged test in
Lemon-purpose, effects, and entanglement-his majority opinion fo-

30. See generally JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (arguing
that the Court should police the democratic process).
3 1. Cf Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Equal Regard, in LAW
AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 200, 203 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000)
(arguing that the religion clauses embody a broad principle of "equal regard," which
"demands that the interests and concerns of every member of the political community should be treated equally, that no person or group should be treated as unworthy
or otherwise subordinated to an inferior status").
32. See infra text accompanying notes 36-133.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 134-215.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 216-257.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 258-264.
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cused on the third prong. 36 He reasoned that the disputed governmental
funding programs violated the first amendment because they generated
excessive administrative entanglement and political divisiveness along
religious lines.37 With regard to political divisiveness, Burger explained:
In a community where such a large number of pupils are served by church-related schools, it can be
assumed that state assistance will entail considerable political activity.
Partisans of parochial
schools, understandably concerned with rising costs
and sincerely dedicated to both the religious and
secular educational missions of their schools, will
inevitably champion this cause and promote political action to achieve their goals. Those who oppose state aid, whether for constitutional, religious,
or fiscal reasons, will inevitably respond and employ all of the usual political campaign techniques
to prevail. Candidates will be forced to declare and
voters to choose. It would be unrealistic to ignore
the fact that many people confronted with issues of
this kind will find their votes aligned with their
faith.38

Quite sensibly, Burger sought to bolster his position by discussing the workings of democracy. He began with a reasonable point that
numerous justices had reiterated since World War II. "Ordinarily po36. The judicial concern with protecting against excessive entanglements had
been developing in cases preceding Lemon, including Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (stating that the first
amendment protects against governmental involvement in sectarian affairs that
might give rise to "divisive influences"); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Goldberg's Abington concurrence on
"divisive influences"); and Walz v. Tax Commission ofNew York City, 397 U.S. 664,
694-99 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (articulating a concern for entanglements that
included political divisiveness and administrative entanglements). The idea of protecting political equality under the compass of the Establishment Clause began to
take shape in even earlier First Amendment cases. Feldman, From Liberty, supra
note 21, at 679-93.
37. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-24.(1971).

38. Id. at 622.
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litical debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government . . ,,39 Then, citing a law review article by Paul Freund, Burger
asserted a historical fact of questionable accuracy. Although vigorous
political division and debate was normal, "political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First
Amendment was intended to protect. ' 40 Regardless of whether this historical assertion was correct, Burger followed with another reasonable
point about democracy: "The potential divisiveness of such [religiously-inspired political] conflict is a threat to the normal political
process., 4 1 Why might that be? Here again, Burger's opinion came up
short. The mixing of church and state not only could engender gov-

39. Id. A similar point was made by the Court in 1949 when it said: "[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). The Court made the same point in 1969:
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may
cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion
may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance.
But our Constitution says we must take this risk, and our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind
of openness-that is the basis of our national strength and of
the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and
live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-509 (1969).
40. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622 (citing Paul Freund, Public Aid to Parochial

Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969)). Freund himself made this historical
assertion without providing evidence or citing historical sources. In fact, the history
of the adoption of the First Amendment religion clauses is ambiguous and complex.
The first Congress and the framing generation probably were not contemplating potential political divisiveness when they adopted the Establishment Clause. See
FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T, supra note 2, at 145-74 (discussing the emergence of the
First Amendment against the background of the American Revolution and the constitutional framing in general); FELDMAN, DIVIDED, supra note 19, at 19-56 (discussing the origins of the religion clauses).
41. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
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ernmental interference with religious institutions, Burger reasoned, but
also the converse-religion could interfere with governmental practices. Religiously-inspired political divisiveness "could divert attention
from the myriad issues and problems" confronting governmental offi42
cials and institutions.
In the Lemon case itself, "[t]o have States or
communities divide on the issues presented by state aid to parochial
schools 43would tend to confuse and obscure other issues of great urgency."
While the Court continues to invoke the Lemon test more than
thirty-five years after its introduction, 4 numerous justices have criticized it, 45 and Court majorities have referred to it as merely a "helpful
signpost., 46 The justices' dissatisfaction with Lemon has prompted
some to suggest (and sometimes to apply) alternative doctrinal tests for
resolving Establishment Clause disputes. The coercion test, initially
delineated by Justice Anthony Kennedy, has two parts: first, the "government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion
or its exercise,, 47 and second, the government "may not, in the guise of
avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.' 48 The endorsement test, introduced by
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, also has two parts. First, does the state
action create excessive governmental entanglement with religion? Second, does the state action amount to governmental endorsement or disapproval of religion? 49 Indeed, when O'Connor originally articulated
the endorsement test, she suggested that it might be interpreted in two

42. Id. at 623.
43. Id. at 622-23.
44. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 859-61 (2005) (refusing to abandon the Lemon purpose test).
45. E.g., id. at 889-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
46. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (citing Hunt v. McNair, 413

U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
47. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
48. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
49. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ways. On the one hand, the endorsement test might be read as no more
than a reformulation of the Lemon test, 5° or on the other hand, it might5
'
be interpreted as emphasizing the protection of political equality.
O'Connor wrote: "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite
message." 52 Religion cannot be a ground for diminishing an individual's connection to or participation in the democratic arena. "The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
53
community.
No part of the Lemon test has proven more controversial than
the entanglements prong. In his concurring and dissenting opinion in
Lemon, Justice Byron White accepted the purpose and effects prongs,
which the Court had previously articulated,54 but questioned the majority's focus on entanglements. He criticized the Court's reasoning as "a
curious and mystifying blend ' 55 and claimed that the entanglements
prong created "an insoluble paradox. 56 The second Lemon prong, proscribing religious effects, required the government to ensure that any
public funding supplied to religious schools was not used to advance
religion. Yet, governmental monitoring of religious schools-to track
the use of public funds-was likely to be deemed excessive entanglement.

50. Id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (that the endorsement test "clarifies
the Lemon test as an analytical device").
51. Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543, 594 (1986).

52. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (citing Sch. Dist. Of
Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
55. Lemon v. Kurztman, 403 U.S. 602, 666 (1971) (White, J., concurring and
dissenting).
56. Id. at 668 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
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B. Application of the Entanglements Prong
Despite White's initial reservations about Lemon's third prong,
the justices continued for more than a decade to apply the prong. They
determined in numerous establishment-clause cases whether the governmental action created excessive entanglements.
In Tilton v.
57
Richardson, decided the same day as Lemon, a five-justice majority
upheld a federal statute that provided grants to colleges and universities, including religious schools, for the construction of buildings devoted to secular education. In discussing the issue of administrative entanglement, Burger's plurality opinion emphasized the differences
between primary and secondary schools, on the one hand, and schools
of higher education, on the other hand. The Catholic institutions of
higher education involved in the case predominantly aimed "to provide
their students with a secular education., 58 Consequently, unlike the
funding programs invalidated in Lemon, the government here did not
need to monitor closely the schools' activities to ensure that public
monies were not diverted to religious purposes. 59 Two years later, in
Hunt v. McNair, the Court followed the Tilton reasoning to uphold a
state program that authorized revenue bonds for a sectarian college, but
that same day, in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,61 the Court invalidated a state law fimding religious
primary and secondary schools. Because the Nyquist Court resolved
the case based on the effects prong, it did not discuss potential administrative entanglement. Nonetheless, in dictum, the Court cautioned
against the likelihood of engendering political divisiveness; public
funding of religious schools "carries grave potential for entanglement
in the broader sense of continuing political strife over aid to religion. 62

57. 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971).
58. Id. at 687.
59. Id.
60. 413 U.S. 734, 743-45 (1973).
61. 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973).
62. Id. at 794. The same day, the Court decided additional establishmentclause cases. In Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413
U.S. 472 (1973), the Court invalidated, pursuant to the Lemon effects prong, a state
program that funded testing in religious schools. Id. at 482. In Sloan v. Lemon, 413
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The Court continued with such fact specific analyses of entanglement in subsequent cases. In Meek v. Pittenger,63 decided in 1975,
the Court invalidated a state program that provided teachers and counselors to elementary and secondary religious schools for the performance of auxiliary services, such as remedial instruction, on school
premises. The Court reasoned that the state failed the entanglements
prong because of both administrative entanglement and political divisiveness. Although the teachers and counselors were public employees,
they would be "performing important educational services in schools in
which education is an integral part of the dominant sectarian mission
and in which an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious
belief is constantly maintained. "6 The state therefore needed not only
to impose restrictions on the employees to ensure that they "remain religiously neutral,', 65 but also to "engage in some form of continuing
66
surveillance to ensure that those restrictions were being followed.,
This degree of contact between state and religious personnel and the
monitoring involved constituted excessive administrative entanglement.
Moreover, the Court reasoned that the state funding program was likely
to generate religiously-inspired "political strife, 67 further contravening
the entanglements prong. "The recurrent nature of the appropriation
process [engendered] the prospect of repeated confrontation between
proponents and opponents of the auxiliary-services program [and would
create] successive opportunities for political fragmentation and division
68
along religious lines.,
Yet, the next year, in Roemer v. Board of Public Works of
Maryland,69 the Court upheld in a five-to-four decision a statute providing for "annual noncategorical grants to private colleges," including religious schools, so long as the funds were not used for "sectarian purU.S. 825 (1973), the Court invalidated also pursuant to the effects prong a state program providing for reimbursement of tuition paid to private schools. Id. at 835.
63. 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793

(2000).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 371.
Id. at 372.
Id.
Id. (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973)).
Id.
426 U.S. 736, 739, 767 (1976).
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poses. 'v Justice Harry Blackmun's plurality opinion, joined by only
two other justices, reasoned that, under this program, "[t]he need for
close surveillance of purportedly secular activities" was minimal and
that, consequently, excessive administrative entanglement did not
arise. 71 Moreover, even though this program required annual reconsideration of the funding, it was unlikely to generate political divisiveness,
partly because more than two-thirds of the private colleges eligible un72
der the program were secular.
One year later, in Wolman v. Walter,73 the Court confronted a
complex state statute that supplied various types of aid to primary and
secondary religious schools. A divided Court, with multiple opinions,
upheld most of the provisions. For instance, with regard to the supplying and scoring of standardized tests, a four-justice plurality reasoned
that "the inability of the school to control the test eliminates the need
for the supervision that gives rise to excessive [administrative] entanglement. 74 But with regard to the funding of field trips, a majority
concluded that administrative entanglement existed because the public
school officials would need to keep the religious-school teachers under
"close supervision" to ensure that funds were not diverted for religious
75
purposes.
Aguilar v. Felton,76 decided in 1985, arose from a challenge to
a New York City program that used federal funds (pursuant to federal
statute) to pay teachers for remedial instruction of religious school students on school premises. The city assigned the teachers as well as supervisory personnel, who monitored the teachers to assure that the
funding was used for secular rather than religious education.77 In a
five-to-four decision, the Court held this program unconstitutional primarily because of administrative entanglement. To operate under the
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 736.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 765.
433 U.S. 229, 232 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793

(2000).
74.
75.
76.
(1997).
77.

Id. at 240-41.
Id. at 254.
473 U.S. 402, 405 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
Id. at 406-07 (1985).
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program, city and school personnel would need to cooperate closely.
78
While such close contact alone could violate the establishment clause,
the Court reasoned that the "ongoing" inspections that were required
exacerbated the constitutional violation. 79 "Agents of the city must
visit and inspect the religious school regularly, alert for the subtle or
overt presence of religious matter in [the] classes.,, 80 The Court concluded by obscurely suggesting a tie between, on the one hand, the
governmental surveillance that manifested administrative entanglement
and, on the other hand, political divisiveness. "The numerous judgments that must be made by agents of the city concern matters that may
be subtle and controversial, yet may be of deep religious significance to
the controlling denominations. As government agents must make these
judgments, the dangers of political divisiveness along religious lines
increase. '' 81 In a concurring opinion, Justice Lewis Powell explained
political divisiveness differently. Like the Courts in Meek and Nyquist
(in dictum), Powell reasoned that if religious schools can pursue public
funding in the legislative arena, then ongoing political battles are likely
to generate political divisiveness in accordance with religious divisions.
Catholics will seek finding for Catholic schools; Baptists will seek
funding for Baptist schools; Jews will seek funding for Jewish schools;
and so forth.82

78. Id. at 413.
79. Id.
80. Id. The Court added:
The critical elements of the entanglement proscribed in
Lemon and Meek are thus present in this case. First, as noted
above, the aid is provided in a pervasively sectarian environment. Second, because assistance is provided in the form
of teachers, ongoing inspection is required to ensure the absence of a religious message. In short, the scope and duration of New York City's Title I program in Aguilar would
require a permanent and pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools receiving aid.
Id. at 412-13 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at414.
82. Id. at 416-17 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell wrote:
[T]here remains a considerable risk of continuing political
strife over the propriety of direct aid to religious schools and
the proper allocation of limited governmental resources. As
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C. JudicialRetreat
From 1971, when the Court decided Lemon, to 1985, when the
Court decided Aguilar, an unmistakable trend emerged regarding the
entanglements prong. For a period of time after Lemon, the Court accepted and applied its third prong with equanimity. The cases, it
seemed, turned on the facts. Gradually, however, an increasing number
of justices began to express dissatisfaction and even hostility toward
the entanglements inquiry. Of course, this dissatisfaction started with
White's opinion in Lemon, when he claimed that an entanglements inquiry created "an insoluble paradox."83 In 1976, White reiterated this
critique and recommended the abandonment of the entanglements
prong in his Roemer concurrence, joined by Justice William H.
Rehnquist. 84 Even in those first years after Lemon, as between the two
types of entanglement, the justices tended to stress administrative entanglement over political divisiveness. While Lemon appeared to accord equal importance to the two types of entanglement, administrative
entanglement quickly assumed a position of prominence, as the justices
focused on governmental surveillance and control over religious
schools in a variety of public funding scenarios. In fact, the Court
never found political
divisiveness without first finding administrative
85
entanglement.

this Court has repeatedly recognized, there is a likelihood
whenever direct governmental aid is extended to some
groups that there will be competition and strife among them
and others to gain, maintain, or increase the financial support
of government.
Id. at 416 (Powell, J., concurring). In a companion case, the Court invalidated under
the effects prong a similar funding program that lacked the supervisory mandates of
the New York City program. Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985) overruledby Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
83. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 668 (1971) (White, J., concurring and
dissenting).
84. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White,
J., concurring in the judgment).
85. E.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (holding that a state law
providing assistance to nonpublic religious schools caused both political divisiveness
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In the 1980s, the justices' skepticism toward the entanglements
prong intensified, with particular suspicion directed toward the political-divisiveness component. In Mueller v. Allen, 86 decided in 1983, the
Court upheld a state law granting tax deductions to parents who paid
tuition to religious schools. Writing for a five-justice majority,
Rehnquist briefly dismissed the possibility of administrative entanglements, and then dropped a footnote that sought to narrow the reach of
the political-divisiveness component. 87 This footnote can be construed
as dictum because, as Rehnquist acknowledged, "[n]o party to this litigation has urged" that the state tax law contravened this component of
entanglements. 88 Regardless, the majority reasoned that Lemon should
be strictly limited to its facts, so findings of impermissible political divisiveness would be "confined to cases where direct financial subsidies
are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools.,, 89 The
next year, in Lynch v. Donnelly,90 the Court upheld a governmental exhibition of a creche as part of an extensive Christmas display in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. After quickly finding no administrative entanglement, 9I the Burger majority opinion cited the Mueller footnote and
explained that the Court did not even need to discuss political divisiveness. "This case does not involve a direct subsidy to church-sponsored
schools or colleges, or other religious institutions, and hence no inquiry
into potential political divisiveness is even called for.",92 Despite thus
limiting the political-divisiveness inquiry, Burger added that, for forty
years, until the filing of the lawsuit, nobody had complained about the
93
creche display and that, therefore, political divisiveness did not exist.
O'Connor joined Burger's majority opinion but also wrote a concurrence, where she introduced the endorsement test. Even though
and administrative entanglement), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000).
86. 463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983).
87. Id. at 403-404 n. 11.
88. Id. at 403 n. 11 (noting that an amicus curiae brief raised the issue of political divisiveness).
89. Id. at 404 n. 11.
90. 465 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1984).
91. Id. at 684.

92. Id.
93. Id. at 684-85.
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O'Connor suggested that her new establishment-clause standard might
be interpreted to protect political equality, she nonetheless insisted that
"political divisiveness along religious lines should not be an independent test of constitutionality. 9 4 To inquire into whether a particular
governmental action generated political divisiveness was, according to
O'Connor, "too speculative an enterprise. 95 The "constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the character of the government activity that might cause such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness itself.
The entanglement prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to institutional entanglement. 96
The justices' assault on the entanglements prong continued in
1985. In Wallace v. Jaffree,97 the Court held that a state statute authorizing a period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" violated
Lemon's purpose prong. Rehnquist dissented, returning to Justice
White's argument that the entanglements prong left governments facing
"an insoluable [sic] paradox." 98 In the school funding cases, "we have
required aid to parochial schools to be closely watched lest it be put to
sectarian use, yet this close supervision itself will create an entanglement. ' 99 According to Rehnquist, the entanglements prong was practically unworkable and should, therefore, be abandoned (in fact, he attacked the entirety of the Lemon test).100
Next came Aguilar, in which the majority relied heavily on the
entanglements prong to invalidate the governmental funding program.
O'Connor dissented, joined by Rehnquist, and she denounced the entanglements prong even more vigorously than she had in her Lynch
concurrence. She argued that the Court should overrule Meek, which
had held that a funding program violated the Lemon prohibition against
administrative entanglement. The Meek Court had reasoned that surveillance was needed to ensure that public school teachers taught only
secular lessons when working in religious school classrooms.

94. Id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 472 U.S. 38, 41, 55-57 (1985).
98. Id. at 109 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

99. Id.
100. Id. at 110-11.
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O'Connor now maintained that such surveillance was unnecessary and
that, consequently, administrative entanglement did not exist.' 0 ' Going
further, O'Connor not only repudiated the political-divisiveness component of the entanglements prong, she also argued that the Court
102
should no longer inquire into "institutional" entanglements.
his position that the Court
Rehnquist wrote his own dissent, reiterating
03
had created a 'Catch-22' paradox."1
When Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy joined the Court
in 1986 and 1988 respectively, Rehnquist and O'Connor had the votes
needed to pronounce their hostilities toward the entanglements prong in
majority opinions (White did not retire until 1993). In Bowen v. Kendrick,104 decided in 1988, the Court upheld a federal grant program that
funded organizations, including religious ones, dealing with adolescent
sexuality and pregnancy. Writing for a five-justice majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted that the federal statutory program required the
government to monitor the use of the public funds to some extent.
Rehnquist, however, would not be caught on the horns of "yet another
'Catch-22' argument [whereby] the very supervision of the aid to assure that it does not further religion renders the statute invalid."' 0 5 He
refused to find administrative entanglement because, he reasoned, the
funded organizations were not as "pervasively sectarian" as parochial
was not pervasive enough
schools, 0 6 and the governmental monitoring
07
to constitute "excessive entanglement."
Matters came to a head in 1997 when the Court reconsidered
the federal funding program held unconstitutional in Aguilar. Such a
program would allow New York City to pay teachers for remedial instruction of religious school students on school premises. In Agostini v.
Felton,'°8 a five-to-four decision with a majority opinion by O'Connor,
101. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 427-28 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 429.
103. Id. at 420-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that "aid must be supervised to ensure no entanglement but the supervision itself is held to cause an entanglement").
104. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
105. Id. at 615.
106. Id. at 616.
107. Id. at 617.
108. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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the Court overruled Aguilar and upheld the funding statute. Since the
Aguilar Court had relied on the entanglements prong, O'Connor enthusiastically and predictably sought to break the supports of the Aguilar
holding by attenuating the entanglements inquiry. She began by reasoning that, generally, the Court had considered the same factors to ascertain governmental effects, under the second Lemon prong, and excessive entanglements, under the third Lemon prong. "[T]o assess
entanglement, we have looked to 'the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and religious authority."" 0 9 Because of these overlapping analyses, O'Connor
concluded, "it is simplest"1 0 to "treat""' entanglement "as an aspect of
the inquiry into a statute's effect."' 2 Lemon, it seemed, had become a
two-pronged test, examining purpose and effects. Turning specifically
to Aguilar, O'Connor reasoned that it had "rested on three grounds,"
none of which could any longer sustain the weight of the decision. 13
When it came to administrative entanglement, O'Connor explained that
the Court no longer assumed that governmental officials needed to
monitor the teachers, and that, moreover, the Court now found that a
reasonable degree of cooperation and surveillance did not constitute
excessive entanglement. Finally, O'Connor concluded that political divisiveness was "insufficient" ' 1 4 by itself "to create an 'excessive' entanglement." '" 5 The federal funding program did not contravene the effects prong, including its entanglements component. 16
109. Id. at 232 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971)).
110. Id. at 233.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 233-34.
The Court wrote:
To summarize, New York City's Title I program does not run

afoul of any of three primary criteria we currently use to
evaluate whether government aid has the effect of advancing
religion: It does not result in governmental indoctrination;
define its recipients by reference to religion; or create an excessive entanglement.

Id. at 234.
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While some justices, particularly Stephen Breyer and David
Souter, still invoke political-divisiveness concerns in some guise,"' a
majority of justices have continued after Agostini to spurn the entanglements inquiry, especially the political-divisiveness component. In
Mitchell v. Helms,'1 8 decided in 2000, a six-justice majority upheld a
federal funding program that provided for the loan of educational materials, such as library and computer equipment, to primary and secondary schools, including religious schools. Writing for a plurality, Justice Clarence Thomas emphasized the changes to the Lemon test that
Agostini had wrought:
Whereas in Lemon we had considered whether a
statute (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a primary
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3)
creates an excessive entanglement between government and religion, in Agostini we modified
Lemon for purposes of evaluating aid to schools
and examined only the first and second factors. We
... recast Lemon's entanglement inquiry as simply
one criterion relevant to determining a statute's effect. We also acknowledged that our cases had
pared somewhat the factors that could justify a
finding of excessive entanglement. 19
Then, quoting from Agostini, Thomas iterated the "'three primary criteria we currently use to evaluate whether government aid has
the effect of advancing religion: It does not result in governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to religion; or create an
excessive entanglement.
Regardless, despite Thomas's efforts to
dim the already-fading lights of the entanglements prong, he then ad-

117. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 859-63 (2005) (discussing endorsement-political divisiveness concerns as part of purpose prong); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-29 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the establishment-clause protection against political divisiveness).
118. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
119. Id. at 807-808 (internal citations omitted).
120. Id. at 808 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)).
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mitted that the Court did not need to address the entanglements issue
because the litigants had not actually raised it. "21
In 2002, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris'22 upheld a school voucher
program from Cleveland, Ohio, which allowed parents to use public
money to help pay for private-school education, including at religious
schools. Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and John Paul Stevens, dissented, elaborating at length the dangers of political divisiveness that
the voucher program engendered. 123But Rehnquist's majority opinion,
joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy, dismissed these
concerns in a footnote, refusing to consider "the invisible specters of
'divisiveness' and 'religious strife.' ' 124 Instead, Rehnquist applied only
the purpose and effects prongs. He focused on effects but did not articulate specific factors encompassed within that prong (such as entanglements); rather he emphasized that, under the voucher program, the
government remained neutral (providing money for public and private
schools, including religious ones)12 and that parents retained "private
choice" to decide where they would spend their vouchers. 126 Besides
joining Rehnquist's majority opinion, O'Connor concurred, adding that
Agostini had "folded the entanglement inquiry" into the effects
127
prong.
121. Id. Thomas nonetheless concluded that Meek and Wolman were "no
longer good law." Id.
122. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
123. Id. at 717-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 662 n.7. Rehnquist explained:
Justice Breyer would raise the invisible specters of 'divisiveness' and 'religious strife' to find the program unconstitutional. It is unclear exactly what sort of principle Justice
Breyer has in mind, considering that the program has ignited
no 'divisiveness' or 'strife' other than this litigation. Nor is
it clear where Justice Breyer would locate this presumed authority to deprive Cleveland residents of a program that they
have chosen but that we subjectively find 'divisive.' We
quite rightly have rejected the claim that some speculative
potential for divisiveness bears on the constitutionality of
educational aid programs.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
125. Id. at 648-63.
126. Id. at 649-53.
127. Id. at 668 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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Currently, then, the justices generally maintain that the Lemon
test-or at least, its first two prongs (purpose and effects)-is, for the
most part, still good law. But the justices have so vigorously assailed
the entanglements prong, including especially its political divisiveness
element, that its vitality is uncertain. The Court's treatment of two Ten
Commandments cases in 2005 illustrates this indefiniteness.
In
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union, 128 a five-to-four
decision, the Court invalidated the posting of the Ten Commandments
in county courthouses, but in Van Orden v. Perry,129 also a five-to-four
decision, the Court upheld a display of the Ten Commandments etched
on a monument that sat in a monument park surrounding the Texas
state capitol (there were seventeen monuments and twenty-one historical markers). Breyer was the swing vote, belonging to the majority in
each case. In McCreary, he joined Souter's majority opinion, but in
Van Orden, he refused to join Rehnquist's opinion, which thus represented a four-justice plurality. Souter's McCreary opinion maneuvered
warily through the Lemon thicket. Souter began by stating that Lemon
had "summarized ... three familiar considerations for evaluating Establishment Clause claims," but he never expressly articulated the three
prongs. 3 0 He consequently avoided taking a clear stance on the entanglements prong. Instead, he focused on the county governments' purposes in posting the Ten Commandments. Yet, within this discussion
of purposes, Souter embedded political-divisiveness concerns, quoting
O'Connor's explication of her endorsement test as protecting political
equality. "By showing a purpose to favor religion, the government
'sends the ... message to ... nonadherents 'that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members ....,,,131
Meanwhile, in Van Orden, Rehnquist's plurality opinion brushed aside
all of the Lemon prongs as "not useful in dealing" with the Ten Commandments display.132 Instead, Rehnquist emphasized that the gov-

128. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).

129. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
130.

McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005).

131. Id. at 860 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984))
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686.
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ernment, throughout history, had similarly displayed religious symbols
and communicated religious messages; the tradition should be sustained. 133 To Rehnquist, the potential political divisiveness of religious
symbols and displays, like the Ten Commandments, was beside the
point.
II. IN DEFENSE OF THE ENTANGLEMENTS PRONG
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Lemon did not persuasively
justify the entanglements-prong protection against political divisiveness. While Burger's failure does not necessarily impugn the politicaldivisiveness component, it does demand a response. This Part of the
Article draws on political theory, supported by social science research,
and American history to justify judicial efforts to diminish religiouslyinspired political divisiveness.
A. PoliticalTheory
Political theory, bolstered by social science evidence, justifies a
judicial concern for religiously-inspired political divisiveness. From
the framing through the 1920s, the United States operated as a republican democracy. Citizens and elected officials were supposed to be virtuous: in the political realm, they were to pursue the common good or
public welfare rather than their own private interests. 134 The pursuit of
"private and partial interests" was the corruption of republican government. 35 To be sure, during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the conceptions of virtue and the common good transformed. For
instance, in the 1790s, Americans condemned political parties as factional groups bent on satisfying their own interests. Political parties

133. Id. at 686-90.
134. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 29, at 14-45, 153-208; see
Feldman, UnenumeratedRights, supra note 29, at 50-57 (explaining republican democracy and republican democratic judicial review).
135. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 17761787, at 59 (1969).
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threatened the welfare of the republic. 136 By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the political party had become an accepted institution of republican democracy. Parties, it now seemed, promoted
the common good by encouraging the average person to participate in
the democratic process." In fact, with the acceptance of political parties, voter turnout increased dramatically during the first part of the
nineteenth century. In 1824, voter turnout for the presidential election
was only 16.2 percent, but with the help of political parties, turnout
soared to an antebellum high of 77.5 percent in 1840. After the Civil
War, turnout continued to climb, reaching a high of 82.4 percent for the
1876 election. 138

While republican democracy proved flexible and resilient, a variety of forces, including industrialization, urbanization, and immigration, placed it under tremendous strain in the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries.139 In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the regime finally collapsed and was replaced by a new one: pluralist democracy. In
the republican system, an alleged lack of civic virtue could preclude
one from participating in democratic processes. On this ground, the
exclusion of African Americans, Irish-Catholic immigrants, and other
peripheral groups was supposedly justified.14 ° Under pluralist democracy, however, one did not need to demonstrate civic virtue to qualify
as a participant. During the thirties, many ethnic and immigrant urbanites who had previously been discouraged from partaking in national
politics became voters and actively cast their support for the New
Deal.14 ' But with more widespread participation, the point of democ136. STANLEY ELKINS

& ERIC

MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM

596-617

(1993).
137.

EDWARD PESSEN, JACKSONIAN AMERICA: SOCIETY PERSONALITY

AND

POLITICS 197-232 (rev. ed. 1985); HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER 171-74

(1990).
138. ERIK W. AUSTIN, POLITICAL FACTS OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1789, at

378-79 (1986) (Table 3.12: National Voter Turnout, 1824-1984).
139. FELDMAN, FREE ExPRESSION, supra note 29, at 166-97.
140. Stephen M. Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First-Amendment Protections: Why Does the Supreme Court Favor Free Expression Over Religious
Freedom?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 434-35 (2006) [hereinafter Feldman, Theory
and Politics].
141. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW
DEAL 332 (1963).
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ratic politics changed: politics became the pursuit of self-interest rather
than the common good. Interest-group efforts to satisfy preexisting
values and desires became normal and legitimate. Governmental goals
could no longer be condemned as contravening the common good; all
such substantive goals were determined through interest-group bargaining, coalition building, negotiation, and compromise. Ultimately, then,
pluralist democracy was defined through a process that ensured full and
fair participation, the assertion of one's interests and values, especially
42
in the legislative arena.
Pluralist democracy emerged first as a social and political reality in the early 1930s, though by the end of the decade, political and
constitutional theorists were struggling to explicate and justify this new
form of democratic practice.14 3 After World War II, Robert A. Dahl
44
emerged as, perhaps, the foremost theorist of pluralist democracy.
Dahl began by emphasizing the crucial difference between republican
and pluralist democracies. "[T]he ancient belief that citizens both
could and should pursue the public good rather than their private ends
became more difficult to sustain, and even impossible, as 'the public
good' fragmented into individual and group interests."1 45 Because pluralist (or polyarchal) democracy accepted the inexorable pursuit of selfinterest-rather than the pursuit of an ideal substantive goal (the common good)-pluralist democracy required the institutionalization of a
"process" that would allow the people to determine which interests
would be at least temporarily enshrined as communal goals.146 A
142. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 29, at 291-348; EDWARD A.
PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 197-266 (1973). Early theorists
of pluralist democracy included Walter Lippmann, John Dewey, Joseph A. Schumpeter, and Carl J. Friedrich. WALTER LIPPMANN, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES
OF THE GOOD SOCIETY (1937); JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE (1939);
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942); CARL J.
FRIEDRICH, THE NEW BELIEF IN THE COMMON MAN (1942).
143. E.g., DEWEY, supra note 142; LIPPMANN, supra note 142.
144. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989) [hereinafter
DEMOCRACY]; ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter PREFACE].
145. DEMOCRACY, supra note 144, at 30.
146. Id. at 83, 106; PREFACE, supra note 144, at 67-71. "Democracy means,
literally, rule by the people .... In order to rule, the people must have some way of
ruling, a process for ruling." DEMOCRACY, supra note 144, at 106. When Dahl uses
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communal goal was legitimate only if the conditions for democracy
were satisfied-if the proper process was followed. Thus, Dahl's primary aim was to identify the conditions or prerequisites for the operation of a democratic process.1 47 For instance, in an election, the weight
of each individual's vote must be "identical," and a candidate or policy
alternative "with the greatest number of votes [must be] declared the
winning choice.' 4 8 But the first and foremost
condition for democ• .
,,149
racy, Dahl explained, is "effective participation.
Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their
preferences as to the final outcome. They must
have adequate and equal opportunities for placing
questions on the agenda and for expressing reasons
for endorsing one outcome rather than another.150
During the post-World War II era, pluralist democracy
achieved
151 hegemonic status as the correct theory and practice of democracy.
Even during the heights of the so-called "civic republican revival" of the late-twentieth century-when historians and political scientists rediscovered the republican democratic roots
of the nation..152
pluralist democracy retained its predominant position.
Few histori-

the precise term, "pluralist democracy," he refers to a democratic government where
"[i]nstead of a single center of sovereign power there [are] multiple centers of
power, none of which are or can be wholly sovereign." ROBERT A. DAHL,
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (1967); see ROBERT A. DAHL,
DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 4-5 (1982) (discussing elements of pluralist
democracy).
147. "What are the distinctive characteristics of a democratic process of govemnment?" DEMOCRACY, supra note 144, at 106.
148. PREFACE, supra note 144, at 67; see DEMOCRACY, supra note 144, at 10911 (discussing voting equality).
149. DEMOCRACY, supra note 144, at 109.

150. Id.
151. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 29, at 329-48, 383-419.
152. Id. at 680 n.4. Key books in the civic republican revival included the following: Wood, supra note 135; BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT
(1975); see Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 WIS.
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ans of republican democracy doubted that, at some point in American
history, pluralist democracy (or some type of liberalism) supplanted
civic republicanism; the scholarly debates revolved largely around the
timing of the transition.153 Given this unequivocal primacy of pluralist
democracy, the issue of religiously-inspired political divisiveness, visA-vis the establishment clause, should be approached from within pluralist democratic parameters.
Pluralist democracy assumes that citizens bring diverse, preexisting interests and values to the democratic arena, that they jostle for
advantage, and that they try to win the democratic battles-but also that
they negotiate and compromise when expedient. 5 4 Crucially, while
pluralist democratic citizens might strongly hold and pursue their preexisting interests and values, they must always be willing to accommodate the interests and values of others. 55 "Compromise [and] unreflective practicality" lubricate the gears of a pluralist democratic regime,156
while all forms of "moralistic absolutism" bring the machine to a
halt.157 Thus, the difficulty of religiously-inspired political positions:
some religious beliefs are absolutes. They are not merely strongly held
positions; they are convictions, imbued with certitude, excluding doubt.
For instance, the Southern Baptist Convention's Baptist Faith and Message, adopted in the year 2000, begins as follows:
The Holy Bible was written by men divinely inspired and is God's revelation of Himself to man.
It is a perfect treasure of divine instruction. It has
God for its author, salvation for its end, and truth,

L. REv. 679, 682-701 (discussing the influence of the civic republican revival on legal scholarship).
153. Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM.
HIST. 11, 24 (1992); see, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED:
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993) (ar-

guing that republican democracy collapsed in the 1930s).
154. See, e.g., DEWEY, supra note 142, at 175-76 (discussing the importance of
negotiation in democratic processes).
155. See DEMOCRACY, supra note 144, at 260 (arguing that polyarchies or pluralist democracies fail when distinctive subcultures cannot accommodate each
other).
156. PURCELL, supra note 142, at 253.
157. Id.
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without any mixture of error, for its matter. Therefore, all Scripture is totally true and trustworthy. It
reveals the principles by which God judges us, and
therefore is, and will remain to the end of the
world, the true center of Christian union, and the
supreme standard by which all human conduct,
creeds, and religious opinions should be tried. 18
By the very nature of such religious convictions, they sometimes cannot be accommodated to other interests and values, whether in
the democratic arena or elsewhere. A religious individual should not
be expected to compromise an absolute truth derived from God's Scripture. Former presidential candidate Mike Huckabee openly proclaimed
his religiosity: "My faith is my life-it defines me. My faith doesn't
influence my decisions, it drives them." 159 Unsurprisingly, on the issue
of abortion, Huckabee emphasized his resoluteness: "My convictions
regarding the sanctity of life have always been clear and consistent,
without equivocation or wavering."160 Most important, then, religious
convictions at times cannot be harmonized readily with the pluralist
democratic process, which requires the willingness of citizens to negotiate and compromise. Indeed,• according
to Dahl, democracy might be
,161
said to rest "upon compromise.
Yet, as the Lutheran pastor and renowned professor of religious history Martin Marty explains, some religious believers "resist efforts at finding consensus."'' 62 From their
perspective, the religious should not be sacrificed to the profane.163
158. Southern Baptist Convention, The Baptist Faith and Message (2005),
http://sbc.net/bfm/bfm2000.asp. (follow the link to "Download the 2000 Baptist
Faith and Message in PDF format" for the full text in PDF format).
159. Huckabee Ad: Faith and Politics, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hs
H42NzFF2A (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (original site no longer active,
http://www.mikehuckabee.com/?FuseAction=Issues.View&lssue-id=9).
160. Huckabee Ad: Sanctity ofLife, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-7vParu
So9GE (original site no longer active http://www.mikehuckabee.com/?FuseAction=
Issues.View&Issueid=1 1).
161. PREFACE, supra note 144, at 4.
162. Martin E. Marty, The Widening Gyres of Religion and Law, in LAW AND
RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 24, 31.
163. Some theorists argue that religious beliefs should not be relied upon in political debates; secular reasons should be offered in any public debate because religious convictions are likely to inhibit the free and open discussion and negotiation
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Besides impeding compromise, religiously-inspired political
divisiveness is likely to interfere with the pluralist democratic process
in another way. When religious convictions permeate political debates,
religious minorities probably will be the losers-precisely because they
depart from the religious mainstream.. According to Dahl, a criterion
requisite to pluralist democracy is that participants possess certain enforceable legal rights, such as freedom of speech. 164 One right essential
to the pluralist democratic process-arising from the process itself-is
political equality.16 Each citizen must be afforded a full and fair opportunity to influence political debates, regardless of religious beliefs,
racial makeup, sexual orientation, and so on. Significantly, Dahl insists
that, as a matter of logic, a democratic majority cannot impair such crucial rights, like political equality, while acting in accordance with democratic processes. "[I]n such a case the majority would not-could
not-be acting by 'perfectly democratic procedures' [because these
rights] are integral to the democratic process."1 66 Without the protection of "primary political rights," 167 individuals would be unable "to
participate fully, as equal citizens, in the making of all the collective
decisions by which they are bound."'' 68 Moreover, Dahl seeks a "'real'
political equality,"' 6 9 not merely a "'formal"' equality.17 ° In Dahl's
terminology, "political resources" must be distributed relatively
equally. 17 1 If governmental actions diminish the political influence of
religious minorities qua religious minorities, then from Dahl's perspective, the formal requirements for pluralist democracy cannot possibly
be satisfied. 172 To be sure, religious minorities will unavoidably be on
that pluralist democracy demands. Robert Audi, The Place ofReligious Argument in
a Free and Democratic Society, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY,
supra note 1, at 69.

164. DEMOCRACY, supra note 144, at 169-73.
165. Id. at 130-31.
166. Id. at 170.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 175. Democracy has limits "built into the very nature of the process
itself. If you exceed those limits, then you necessarily violate the democratic process." Id. at 172.
169. Id. at 130.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 178.
172. Id. at 131.
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the losing side in some political disputes. Winning and losing are the
constant companions of democratic rule; no individual or societal group
can be guaranteed victory. But the government should not be permitted
to take actions that persistently push religious minorities onto the losing side. Religious minorities are entitled to political equality, to
the
3
citizens."
other
all
with
equally
debates
political
right to influence
Unshakable religious convictions not only threaten to thwart
the pluralist democratic process, they also threaten to weaken the
American commitment to democratic culture. Dahl maintains that pluralist democracy can be sustained only if the people maintain a culture
conducive to the democratic process. 174 "In practice ... the democratic process isn't likely to be preserved for very long unless the people
of a country preponderantly believe that it's desirable and unless their
belief comes to be embedded in their habits, practices, and culture.' 7 5
The democratic culture encompasses an ethos that facilitates negotiation and compromise. If individuals are inflexible, if they refuse to find
a middle ground, the democratic process cannot get off the ground.
Thus, when a religion inculcates absolutes, and when those absolutes
are translated into political agendas and goals that are non-negotiable,
the mix of religion and politics diminishes the culture of democracy.
And legal doctrine, Dahl argues, cannot overcome a deficient culture;
courts cannot compel an undemocratic people to govern itself in accord
with the pluralist democratic process.176 Even so, courts might help
nurture the democratic culture-by proscribing governmental actions
that would encourage the people to inject their religious beliefs into the
public square and political debates.

173. This argument for protecting the political equality of religious minorities
is closely related to John Ely's representation-reinforcement argument for protecting
discrete and insular minorities. ELY, supra note 30; United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
174. "To assume that this country has remained democratic because of its Constitution seems to me an obvious reversal of the relation; it is much more plausible to
suppose that the Constitution has remained because our society is essentially democratic." PREFACE, supra note 144, at 143; see DEWEY, supra note 142, at 134 (emphasizing the importance of culture to democracy).
175. DEMOCRACY, supra note 144, at 172.
176. Id. at 169-70, 172-73, 175.
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But when governmental actions generate religiously-inspired
political divisiveness, then the government likely undermines both political equality and democratic culture. Psychological studies demonstrate that identity with or membership in social groups strongly influences individual attitudes toward others. An individual tends to
disfavor outgroup members while simultaneously favoring "in-group
members in the allocation of rewards, in their personal regard, and in
the evaluation of the products of their labor." 177 In other words, as a
normal function of social group identity, people favor their own group
members while discriminating against others. Social group identity is
so powerful that even the most basic emotional reactions and assessments of self-interest vary with group membership.178 "[A]n individual
will discriminate against a member of an out-group even when there is
no conflict of interest and there is no past history of intergroup hostility.,, 179 Moreover, empirical research suggests that religious membership not only is an especially salient source of group identification but
Religious orientation influences
also often shapes political outlooks.
even judges, who are (supposedly) obligated professionally to decide
cases neutrally, in accordance with the rule of law. In one empirical
study of Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause cases in the

177. Samuel L. Gaertner, et al., Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Benefits of
Recategorization,57 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 239, 239 (1989).
178. See Marilynn B. Brewer, The Social Self- On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time, 17 PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. BULLETIN 475, 476 (1991); Marilynn
B. Brewer & Sherry K. Schneider, Social Identity and Social Dilemmas: A Doubleedged Sword, in SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 169, 170 (Dominic Abrams & Michael

A. Hogg eds., 1990); Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kityama, The Cultural Construction of Self and Emotion: Implicationsfor Social Behavior, in EMOTION AND
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF MUTUAL INFLUENCE 89, 89-91 (Shinobu Kitayama & Hazel Rose Markus eds., 1994); Wolfgang T6nnesmann, Group Identification and PoliticalSocialisation, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM 175, 184
(Vernon Reynolds, et al., eds., 1986).
CULTURE:

179. Johan M.G. van der Dennen, Ethnocentrism and In-Group/Out-Group
Differentiation: A Review and Interpretation of the Literature, in THE
SOCIOBIOLOGY OF ETHNOCENTRISM, supra note 178, at 1, 17.
180. Donald R. Songer & Susan J. Tabrizi, The Religious Right in Court: The
Decision Making of ChristianEvangelicals in State Supreme Courts, 61 J. POL. 507
(1999); Clyde Wilcox, Fundamentalists and Politics: An Analysis of the Effects of
Differing OperationalDefinitions, 48 J. POL. 1041 (1986).
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lower federal courts, covering 1986 to 1995, the authors concluded that
in "religious freedom decisions, the single most prominent, salient, and
consistent influence on judicial decisionmaking was religion-religion
in terms of affiliation of the claimant, the background of the judge, and
the demographics of the community.' 81 Other studies showed that
judges' religious affiliations influenced their perceptions of not only
religious-freedom cases per se but also cases
j.
• involving
• ,.
182 gay rights, obscenity, the death penalty, and gender discrimination.
In short, empirical evidence suggests that religious affiliation can be a strong
source of social identification and that such social identification is
likely to engender social and political division and discrimination. Majority-ingroup members will disfavor minority-outgroup members.
When the government nurtures religious identification, governmental
action will thus frequently encourage political divisiveness detrimental
to political equality and democratic culture.
Finally, the nature of religion itself exacerbates the threat to
pluralist democracy. Religion cannot be easily cabined in some hypothetical religious realm, separate from a secular realm. For some religious individuals, as well as for some religions, religious convictions
are always pressing outwards, pushing into worldly affairs. Marty explains:
In the pursuits that observers call religion, people
aspire to deal with the ultimate, the whole, the
unum, the All. They are alert to evocations of awe
and wonder. Their sense of the sacred leads most
of them to build community [sic] and undertake
various sorts of mission [sic]. Therefore religion,
when vital, is never easily contained within a defined and disciplined sphere. Religion is never

181. Gregory C. Sisk, et al., Searchingfor the Soul of JudicialDecisionmaking: An EmpiricalStudy ofReligious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 614
(2004); see Scott C. Idleman, The Concealment ofReligious Values in JudicialDeci-

sionmaking, 91 VA. L. REV. 515, 521-23 (2005) (arguing that judges try to conceal
that they are influenced by their religious beliefs).
182. DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 87-91 (2003);
Songer & Tabrizi, supra note 180, at 521.
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self-contained, never unconnected.
It always
83
stands the potential of being "widened."'
Religion, then, will seek to insinuate itself into political debates. And certainly, in a country as religious as the United States, 184 a
mix of religion and politics might seem inevitable. But this inevitability does not mean that the government, in general, and the courts, in
particular, should encouraged or stir the religion-politics mix. Because
religious convictions can impair the pluralist democratic process, pluralist democracy is persistently pitted in battle against religion (or at
least against some religions). In this battle, the government and the
courts should not surrender-though one should never expect religion
to surrender either. To be sure, despite the tenuous status of religion
within the pluralist democratic process, the free exercise of religion
must be protected; government should not attempt to subdue religious
practices and beliefs. Without the free exercise of religion, individual
liberty would be stillborn. But partly for that very reason-because of
the special constitutional protection afforded to religion-courts should
acknowledge and
guard against the tension between religion and plural185
ist democracy.
B. History
American history is replete with examples of political strife
produced by religious differences. In the mid-nineteenth century, Protestant educators sought to create common (or public) schools that

183. Marty, supra note 162, at 26-7.
184. See U.S.

CENSUS BUREAU,

STATISTICAL

ABSTRACT

OF THE UNITED

STATES, Table No. 64, at 56 (2002) (Religious Preference, Church Membership, and
Attendance: 1980-2000) (reporting that church and synagogue membership generally hovers around seventy percent); KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 1, at 9 (reporting poll showing that United States is most religious of western nations). "[T]he
U.S. population remains highly religious in its beliefs and practices, and religion
continues to play a prominent role in American public life." RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE
SURVEY, supra note 14, at 1.
185. See Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of Religion, inLAW AND
RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 226 (arguing that religion
should play a limited role in public deliberations, but that religion should be given
special protection from generally applicable laws).
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would instill Protestant values and attitudes in Catholic children by, for
example, having the children read from the Protestant King James Bible.
Simultaneously, Protestants fought politically to prevent the extension of governmental funding to private religious [read: Catholic]
schools. The anti-aid advocates managed to secure constitutional
amendments in several states precluding such funding, and almost succeeded in pushing through a similar amendment (the Blaine Amendment of 1876) to the national Constitution. 1 7 During the earlytwentieth century, massive immigration from Eastern and Southern
Europe-often more than one-million people per year-combined with
Protestant-American nativism
to• generate
long-running political battles
••
188
over the restriction of immigration.
The anti-immigration forces emphasized the ostensible racial and religious inferiority of recent immigrants. 189 Albert Johnson (R-Wa.), Chair of the House Committee on
Immigration, complained especially about recent Jewish immigrants
and called for a complete suspension of immigration, lasting for two
years. Johnson relied on a report from Wilbur J. Carr, head of the
United States Consular Service (in the State Department), that stated:
"[Potential Jewish immigrants were] of the usual ghetto type. Most of
them are . . . filthy, un-American and often dangerous in their habits."'190 They were, Carr added, "[p]hysically deficient . . . [m]entally
deficient . . . [e]conomically undesirable [and] [s]ocially undesirable:
186. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 29, at 39; PHILIP HAMBURGER,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 219-29 (2002); John C. Jeffries & James E.
Ryan, A PoliticalHistory of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 300
(2001) ("crowds in Philadelphia rioted over whether Catholic children could be re-

leased from the classroom during Bible reading").
187. HAMBURGER, supra note 186, at 296-302; Thomas C. Berg, AntiCatholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 121, 130
(2001). The House passed the Blaine Amendment in 1876, but the Senate vote fell
short of the needed two-thirds majority. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 186, at 301-02.
188. AUSTIN, supra note 138, at 470 (Table 7.4: Total Number of Immigrants

Arriving Annually in the United States, 1820-1980).
189. See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
1860-1925, at 264-99 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the role of nativism in

NATIVISM,

anti-immigration debates).
190. Congressional Committee on Immigration, Temporary Suspension of Immigration (1920), reprintedin THE JEW IN THE MODERN WORLD: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 405, 406 (Paul R. Mendes-Flohr & Jehuda Reinharz eds., 1980).
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Eighty-five to ninety per cent lack any conception of patriotic or national spirit. And the majority of this percentage is mentally incapable
of acquiring it."' 9' In the 1920s, the anti-immigrant advocates triumphed; quotas were established that almost eliminated
Jewish and
192
Catholic immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe.
Republican democracy, it should be emphasized, facilitated the
manifestation of nativist and exclusionary attitudes throughout the
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Condemnations of Catholics,
Jews, and other outsiders were often couched in republican democratic
terminology: they lacked the civic virtue needed to understand the
American commitment to the common good. Political discrimination
against religious minorities could all-too-easily be legitimated in accord
with republican principles. "The chief argument against the wholesale
admission of unassimilable aliens," wrote the editor of World's Work,
"is that it creates nationalistic and racial blocs which are constantly
bringing pressure to bear upon law-making bodies in the interests of
their particular nationalities, which do not think like Americans, but
93
which retain indefinitely their European and Asiatic consciousness.'

Consequently, from the perspective of many old-stock Americans, religious minorities were to be either banished from the country or inculcated with Protestant-American values (hence, the need for Bible reading and similar activities in the public schools). 94
The power of religion to skew American politics was never
more evident than in the presidential election of 1928. The Republican
candidate was the former Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover.
The Democratic candidate was Al Smith, an Irish-Catholic, a child of

191. Id. at 407.
192. Immigration Act of 1924, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 372 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 3d ed. 1944); E. P. HUTCHINSON,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1798-1965, at 175-76,

187-92 (1981); HOWARD M. SACHAR, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS IN AMERICA 323-24

(1992).
193. LYNN DUMENIL, THE MODERN TEMPER 211(1995).

194. See Feldman, Theory and Politics, supra note 140, at 434-35, 451-53,
457-65 (detailing the relation between republican democratic concepts and the ex-

clusion of outsiders).
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an immigrant, and an opponent of Prohibition. 195 A four-time governor
of New York, Smith reveled in his Lower East Side (Manhattan) identity: "The derby hat set at a slightly rakish angle, the flashy suits, the
big cigar, the slight swagger, the striking pronunciations all bespoke
New York .... ..,196 Smith represented what the populist and Protestant
fundamentalist leader William Jennings Bryan had called "the enemy's
country."' 9 7 With Smith opposing Hoover; the 1928 election encapsulated the nation's multiple interrelated divisions: "Catholics versus
Protestants, wets
versus drys, immigrants versus natives, and city ver198
sus country."'
Smith became the first Catholic nominated by a major political
party only because, by the late 1920s, immigrants and their children
constituted approximately one-third of the American population. Even
so, the salience of American anti-Catholicism intensified dramatically
during the 1928 presidential campaign exactly because of Smith's candidacy. 199 A Methodist Bishop from New York State declared, "No
Governor can kiss the papal ring and get within gunshot of the White
House, 200 while an Alabama Reverend proclaimed, "I'd rather see a
saloon on every corner in the South than see the foreigners elect Al
Smith President!, 20 1 The Christian Century, a moderately liberal Protestant publication, encouraged its readers to resist "the seating of a representative of an alien culture, of a mediaeval Latin mentality, of an
undemocratic hierarchy and of a foreign potentate in the great office of
President of the United States. '20 2 Anti-Smith pamphlets sported titles

195. See ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, PREJUDICE AND THE OLD POLITICS 40-76 (1979)
(emphasizing the importance of religion in the 1928 election); SAMUEL LUBELL, THE
FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS

48-55 (3d ed., rev., 1965) (discussing Smith and the

1928 election).
196. LICHTMAN, supra note 195, at 10.
197. LUBELL, supra note 195, at 52.
198. LICHTMAN, supra note 195, at 25.
199. See id. at 73-76 (discussing variations in salience, with an emphasis on religion).
200. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY, 1914-1932 233

(1958).
201. Id. at 238.
202. Id. at 234.
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like "Traffic in Nuns" and "Alcohol Smith. ' ' 2 03 A Tennessee editor and
historian brooded:
[Smith appeals] to the aliens, who feel that the
older America, the America of the Anglo-Saxon
stock, is a hateful thing which must be overturned
and humiliated; to the northern negroes, who lust
for social equality and racial dominance; to the
Catholics who have been made to believe that they
are entitled to the White House, and to the Jews
who likewise are to be instilled with the feeling that
this is the time for God's chosen people to chastise
America yesteryear. . . . As great as have been my

doubts about Hoover,
he is sprung from American
2 4
soil and stock.

0

Smith himself recognized that his ties to the national populace
were tenuous. He ran as an economic conservative and, like Hoover,
invoked the republican democratic principles of virtue and the common
good. Whereas Protestant nativists castigated Smith for his Catholicism, Smith and other Democrats realized they should not attempt to
attract Catholic voters qua Catholics. Democratic supporters did not
"launch a sectarian campaign on behalf of Al Smith," but rather called
for religious freedom.20 5 Regardless, Smith lost the election, and decisively so, garnering only fifteen million popular and eighty-seven electoral votes to Hoover's twenty-one million popular and 444 electoral
votes. 2 06 Smith ran poorly in most areas with large native-born populations, including the traditionally strong Democratic South, where he
lost almost all major cities, including Birmingham, Dallas, and Atlanta. 207 Most distinctly, Smith lost votes because of his Catholicism.
"Protestant opposition to Smith's religion was remarkably widespread,

203. Id.
204. Id. at 239.

205.

LICHTMAN,

supra note 195, at 76.

206. AUSTIN, supra note 138, at 94, 97 (Table 3.1: National Electoral and
Popular Vote Castfor President, 1789-1984).
207. See LiCHTMAN, supra note 195, at 40-76, 122-43 (discussing the importance of religion and the division between urban and rural residents to 1928 election); LUBELL, supra note 195, at 48-49 (discussing urban voting in 1928 election).
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extending to all regions of the nation, to city and country, to church
members and unaffiliated Protestants. 20 8
Of course, another Irish-Catholic nominee successfully ran for
president in 1960. John F. Kennedy's victorious campaign demonstrated two important facts. First, the transformation of the United
States in the 1930s from a republican into a pluralist democracy mattered: erstwhile outsiders could participate en masse in national politics
without first proving that they were sufficiently virtuous to qualify as
voting citizens (and they could, therefore, help elect a Catholic). 0 9
Second, even within the pluralist democratic regime, the potential for
religiously-inspired political divisiveness remained strong. Early in
Kennedy's campaign, many Protestant-Americans questioned whether
his Catholicism rendered him an unworthy candidate. 2 '0 Alluding to
the feared allegiance of a Catholic president to the Vatican, best-selling
author and Protestant minister Norman Vincent Peale wondered
whether JFK was as "free as any other American to give 'his first loyalty to the United States.' 211 In response to such expressions of doubt,
Kennedy was moved to make a well-publicized speech to the Greater
Houston Ministerial Association on September 12, 1960, in order to
address, in his words, "the so-called religious issue. 2 12 Kennedy told
his audience:
[B]ecause I am a Catholic, and no Catholic has ever
been elected President, the real issues in this campaign have been obscured-perhaps deliberately, in
some quarters less responsible than this. So it is
apparently necessary for me to state once againnot what kind of church I believe in, for that should
be important only to me-but what kind of Amer208.

LICHTMAN,

supra note 195, at 71.

209. See THOMAS J. CARTY, A CATHOLIC IN THE WHITE HOUSE? RELIGION,
POLITICS, AND JOHN F. KENNEDY'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (2004) (discussing the
complex role that religion played in Kennedy's campaign and election).
210. See id. at 53-54; KOsMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 1, at 169.
211. CARTY, supra note 209, at 56.
212. Senator John F. Kennedy, Address to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association (Sept. 12, 1960), available at http://www'jfldibrary.org/Historical+Reso
urces/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/JFK+Pre-Pres/Address+of+Senator+
John+F.+Kennedy+to+the+Greater+Houston+Ministerial+Association.htm.
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ica I believe in. I believe in an America where the
separation of church and state is absolute-where
no Catholic prelate would tell the President (should
he be Catholic) how to act, and no Protestant minister would tell his parishioners for whom to votewhere no church or church school is granted any
public funds or political preference-and where no
man is denied public office merely because his religion differs from the President who might
appoint
3
1
him.
elect
might
who
people
the
or
him
After further elaborating his concept of the separation of church
and state, Kennedy reiterated that he spoke only for himself. "[F]or
contrary to common newspaper usage, I am not the Catholic candidate
for President. I am the Democratic Party's candidate for President who
happens also to be a Catholic. I do not speak for my church on public
matters-and the church does not speak for me. '214 While the effects
of Kennedy's speech are difficult to gauge, he unquestionably lost
votes because of his religion even as he won the election, polling only
118,574 more popular votes than Richard Nixon.215

III. PROSCRIBED GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS
Given that pluralist democratic theory and American history
justify judicial efforts to diminish religiously-inspired political divisiveness, one must ask the following question: what governmental actions should courts proscribe pursuant to the Lemon entanglement
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. AUSTIN, supra note 138, at 98 (Table 3.1: National Electoral and Popular
Vote Cast for President, 1789-1984). Kennedy garnered 303 electoral votes compared with Nixon's 219. Id. at 98. Even after Kennedy's speech, "most Protestant

publications would not support him," KOSMIN & LACHMAN, supra note 1, at 170,
though The Christian Century, a moderately liberal interdenominational Protestant
periodical, "changed from opposition to neutrality." Id. "Nonetheless, polls showed
that Kennedy gained votes from moderate Protestants." Id.; see also Philip E. Converse et al., Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election, 55 AM. POL. SCI.

REv. 269, 270-71 (1961) (discussing importance of religion in the election of Kennedy).
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prong (or some similar doctrinal protection against religiously-inspired
political divisiveness, such as the endorsement test)? This Part of the
Article focuses on two types of governmental actions: funding of religious activities or institutions, such as religious schools; and sponsoring or displaying of religious symbols, such as creches. After articulating the entanglements prong in Lemon, the justices never developed it
to its full potential. While they repeatedly considered political divisiveness in the context of governmental funding cases, they never explored its ramifications in the context of governmental displays of religious symbols. Consequently, I will discuss the former type of case but
concentrate on the latter.
A. GovernmentalFunding of Religion
When the government funds religious practices or institutions,
the government introduces an issue that could readily lead to religiously-inspired political divisions. As the justices have explained in
numerous cases, including Lemon, Meek, and Aguilar, the provision of
governmental funding is rarely a one-time affair." 16 Rather, once the
government initiates a funding program-let's say, funding remedial
instruction in all elementary and secondary schools, whether public or
private (including religious schools)-then individuals and interest
groups are likely to assail the legislature (or other appropriate governmental body) with requests for funding (or more funding) on an annual
basis. When such funding might or might not be provided to certain
religious schools, then the respective religious officials will be motivated to lobby the legislature not only to provide funding in accordance
with certain favorable criteria but to increase the amount of funding.
Because such funding programs are likely to encourage religious communities to act as political interest groups, often opposing other relig-

216. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985), overruledby Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 416-18 (Powell, J., concurring);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793 (2000); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971); see Comm. for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973) (dictum on
political divisiveness).
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iously-inspired interest groups, the courts should proscribe this type of
governmental action pursuant to the entanglements prong.
Justice Breyer's dissent in Zelman, joined by Stevens and
Souter, persuasively explained the need for such a judicial proscription.
The majority upheld a school voucher program that allowed parents to
use public money to help pay for religious-school education, but Breyer
reasoned that such a program would engender religiously-inspired political divisiveness. Breyer recognized that immigration had produced
not only momentous demographic but also concomitant social changes.
When [deciding Lemon and Nyquist], the Court did not deny
that an earlier American society might have found a less clear-cut
church/state separation compatible with social tranquility. Indeed, historians point out that during the early years of the Republic, American
schools-including the first public schools-were Protestant in character. Their students recited Protestant prayers, read the King James version of the Bible, and learned Protestant religious ideals. Those practices may have wrongly discriminated against members of minority
religions, but given the small number of such individuals, the teaching
of Protestant religions in schools did not threaten serious social conflict. The twentieth century Court was fully aware, however, that immigration and growth had changed American society dramatically since
its early years. By 1850, 1.6 million Catholics lived in America, and
by 1900 that number rose to twelve million. There were similar per217
centage increases in the Jewish population.
If anything, Breyer continued, the nation has grown even more
religiously diverse. Today, the United States "boasts more than fiftyfive different religious groups and subgroups with a significant number
of members. Major religions include, among others, Protestants,
Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs. And several
of these major religions contain different subsidiary sects with different
religious beliefs." 218 Given this social and religious reality, Breyer explained that the Court had to choose between two different interpreta217. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 719-20 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
218. Id. at 723 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). See also RELIGIOUS
LANDSCAPE SURVEY, supra note 14, at 8 (predicting that the United States will continue to become more religiously diverse).
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tions of the establishment clause. On the one hand, the Court might use
an "equal opportunity' approach,, 219 giving each religion an equal
chance, for example, "to secure state funding or to pray in the public
schools., 220 On the other hand, the Court might draw "fairly clear lines
of separation between church and state., 221 The problem was that, in
practice, the "'equal opportunity' approach was not workable. 222
When so many diverse religions are battling for access to funding or to
inject their views into the public schools, some religions will inevitably
be favored. Equal opportunity, much less "equal treatment,, 223 could
only be hypothetical, not actual. Just as important, the equal opportunity approach would encourage the sundry religious groups to pursue
their own respective interests as strongly as possible in the political
realm. The equal opportunity approach, that is, would nurture religiously-inspired political divisiveness. The only workable method to
achieve equality among religions was separation: removing the government from religious schools, and removing religions from the public
schools. 224
Finally, Breyer explained why the Cleveland, Ohio voucher
program challenged in Zelman was not truly equal and would likely
generate religiously-inspired political battles. Recall, Rehnquist's majority opinion emphasized that parents retained "private choice" to decide where they would spend their vouchers. 225 Partly for that reason,
Rehnquist maintained that the governmental program was neutral; all
religious schools were afforded an equal opportunity to benefit from
the vouchers. Breyer responded that: the government will necessarily
articulate criteria for participating in any voucher program. "Consider
the voucher program here at issue., 226 "That program insists that the
religious school accept students of all religions. Does that criterion
treat fairly groups whose religion forbids them to do so? ' ' 227 Even fur219. 536 U.S. at 721 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
220. Id. at 722-23.

221. Id. at 723.
222. Id. at 722.
223. Id.
224. Id.

225. Id. at 650 (majority opinion).
226. Id. at 724 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
227. Id.
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ther, the Cleveland program required that any participating school not
"'advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or
228
group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion."'
The existence of such limits on the voucher program, however reasonable, will necessarily encourage sundry religious groups to lobby for
criteria favorable to themselves. Political conflicts could readily take
shape around religious differences, as not all religious schools were being treated equally. "How will the public react to government funding
for schools that take controversial religious positions on topics that are
of current popular interest-say, the conflict in the Middle East or the
war on terrorism? ' 229 In addition, Breyer emphasized that government
officials would need to determine whether particular schools satisfied
the statutory criteria. For instance, a government official would need to
decide whether a school teaches hatred of other religions. Does a
Catholic school teach hatred of Judaism if it, following the Vatican, instructs students "to pray that God 'enlighten' the hearts of Jews 'so that
they recognize Jesus Christ, Savior of all mankind?' 230 Do we really
want a government official to resolve this question? Such an intrusion
would, Breyer reasoned, enaffairs
of the government into religious
• •
1.
231
In sum, if even a private-choice
gender resentment and divisiveness.
one
in
Cleveland would likely generlike
the
school voucher program
ate religiously-inspired political divisiveness, as Breyer convincingly
argues, then the Court should remain wary of any government program
funding religious institutions or practices.
B. Governmental Displays ofReligious Symbols
The entanglements-prong prohibition against governmental actions that engender religiously-inspired political divisiveness should
228. Id. (quoting OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(6)).
229. Id.
230. James Carroll, Op-Ed Reviving an Old Insult to the Jews, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 18, 2008, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles
/2008/02/18/reviving-an-old insult to the-jews/ (last accessed February 26, 2008).
Retreating from the reforms of the Second Vatican Council, the Vatican had at first
recommended that Catholics pray "that God 'lift the veil' from "Jewish blindness."'
Id.
231. 536 U.S. at 724-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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preclude the government from sponsoring or displaying religious symbols such as creches. Of course, governmental displays of religious
symbols sometimes entail the spending of governmental funds, and
such an expenditure might produce unconstitutional political divisiveness (as discussed in the previous section). Yet, religious symbolism
cases usually differ from the ordinary religious funding case. Often, in
a religious symbolism case, the expenditure of governmental money is
minimal. Furthermore, the governmental display of a religious symbol
is not likely to produce annual (or repetitive) legislative battles over the
amount of and the criteria for funding.
Even so, regardless of funding, the governmental display of a
religious symbol is likely to generate political divisiveness that should
be deemed unconstitutional. To be clear, the Court has never interpreted the entanglements prong in this manner, but such judicial protection follows from the arguments justifying the diminishment of political divisiveness.
While some justices have deprecated the
entanglements inquiry, including the political-divisiveness component,
as "mystifying, ' '232 a public display of a religious symbol usually has at
least one readily decipherable political meaning. Publicly displayed
religious symbols connote priority. The message is one of division and
inequality: the community and the government favor one particular religion over others.
The Lynch case, upholding a Pawtucket municipal display of a
233
creche, underscored how a publicly displayed religious symbol can
establish religious and political priority. As argued in an amicus curiae
brief filed jointly by the American Jewish Committee and the National
Council of the Churches of Christ, religious displays are likely to demarcate certain citizens as social and political insiders and others as
outsiders in accordance with their religious orientations. 234 After the
American Civil Liberties Union initiated the legal challenge, the Paw-

232. Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602, 666 (1971) (White, J., concurring and
dissenting). See also Roemer v. Bd. of Public Works, 427 U.S. 736, 769 (1976)
(White J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 666).
233. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
234. Brief for the American Jewish Committee & the National Council of the
Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4-7,
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (No. 82-1256).
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tucket mayor alluded to such a division of citizens into insiders and
outsiders. He emphasized that the creche was a crucial element of the
extensive Christmas display-which also included, among other things,
a Christmas
• 235
.tree, a Santa Claus house, and a "Seasons Greetings"
sign -- exactly because of the creche's religious message. The mayor
condemned the lawsuit as "a petty attack aimed at taking Christ out of
Christmas. ' ' 2 36 As reported in a Providence, Rhode Island newspaper, a
Baptist reverend more explicitly explained that the message of the
creche was one of religious and political priority:
[W]hen anybody attacks Christianity and nibbles
away, eventually the whole structure of American
society is threatened. This is a Christian country.
We invite all men to take residence here. But one
condition of that residency is that they respect our
traditions. These are a part of America and we feel
that whoever comes in has an obligation to respect
them, to become familiar with them, and to abide
by them.237
Public support for maintaining the creche display was powerful and unmistakable. Ninety percent of the messages to the ACLU
238
After the district court trial, the
and the city endorsed the creche.
judge reviewed approximately seventy letters sent to the mayor and
local newspapers and concluded as follows:
Overall the tenor of the correspondence is that the
lawsuit represents an attack on the presence of religion as part of the community's life, an attempt
to deny the majority the ability to express publicly
its beliefs in a desired and traditionally accepted
way. In the Mayor's words, "The people absolutely resent somebody trying to impose another
I think the denigrakind of religion on them ....
235. 465 U.S. at 671.
236. WAYNE R. SWANSON, THE CHRIST CHILD GOES TO COURT 19-20 (1990)
(quoting Mayor Dennis M. Lynch).
237. Id. at 22 (citing Barbara Carton, Nativity Scene ParticipantsSpeak Out,
PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, Dec. 6, 1981, Section A).
238. Id. at 20.
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tion, trying to eliminate these kinds of things, is a
step towards establishing
another religion, non239
be.",
may
it
that
religion
Meanwhile, a clinical psychologist testified at trial:
[F]or the child who belongs to a non-Christian
family, seeing a Nativity scene as part of a Citysponsored Christmas display will raise "profound
questions for that child insofar as whether or not
he is okay or more importantly and as part of that
whether his parents are okay." The child will
question, because of the setting in which the Nativity scene occurs, his identification with the
American culture.2 4 °
After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Lynch, the Jewish Dean of the New York University School of Law admitted in the
New York Times, "When I see a government-supported creche, I suddenly feel as if I have become a stranger in my own home, to be tolerated only as long as I accept the dominant religious values. 24' He
added that "[w]hen government, at any level, lends its support to a
Christian religious observance, Jews and other non-Christians are
automatically excluded. 242
In other words, the public display of a religious symbol, the
creche, engendered social divisions based largely on religious differences, and such divisions were manifested in widespread continuing
public support for the display. Of course, the Burger majority opinion
disregarded such religiously-inspired political divisiveness. 243 But
frequently, as in this case, symbols make a difference. In fact, as the
lawsuit and the resultant backlash in Lynch demonstrated, not only
might public displays of religious symbols create religiously-inspired
political divisiveness, but also the legal and political battles that ensue
239. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (D.R.I. 1981), affd691 F.2d
1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
240. Brief of the Respondents at 46-47, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984) (No. 82-1256).
241. Norman Redlich, Nativity Ruling Insults Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1984,
at A19.
242. Id.
243. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684-85.
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because of such displays might generate additional (and more fervent)
divisiveness. By ignoring divisiveness and its potential damage to the
pluralist democratic process, the Court cultivates exclusionary practices reminiscent of republican democracy. The Court fosters a return
to the "good ol' days" when, in practice, white Protestant values were
deemed virtuous and white Protestant goals were enshrined as the
common good. Protestant Bible reading and prayers in the public
schools? Why not?
Why not? Because the public performance of religious rituals, the public recitation of religious tenets, and the public display of
religious symbols contravene the political equality that undergirds
pluralist democracy. The dissenters in Van Orden v. Perry,"' which
upheld the Ten Commandments display etched on a monument in the
245
Texas state capitol monument park, emphasized how that religious
display struck at the heart of political equality. Souter's dissenting
opinion, joined by Justices Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, underscored "the simple realities that the Ten Commandments constitute a
religious statement, that their message is inherently religious, and that
the purpose of singling them out in a display is clearly the same. 246
Rehnquist admitted as much in his plurality opinion: "Of course, the
Ten Commandments are religious-they were so viewed at their inception and so remain. The monument, therefore, has religious significance.",2 47 Stevens's dissent, joined by Ginsburg, explained that
the Ten Commandments display was not only religious but sectarian
248
First, the display favored Christianity and Judaon two accounts.
ism because the Ten Commandments is "'a sacred text"' for those religions (and Islam) but not others. 249 The Ten Commandments pre244. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
245. Id. at 681.
246. Id. at 738 (Souter, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 690 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion); see id. at 692 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (applauding Rehnquist's recognition of the monument's "religious significance").
248. "The message transmitted by Texas' chosen display is quite plain: This
State endorses the divine code of the 'Judeo-Christian' God." Id. at 707 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
249. Id. at 716 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
41 (1980)). As Scalia has pointed out elsewhere, Islam also accepts the divinity of
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scribe "a compelled code of conduct from one God, namely, a JudeoChristian God, that is rejected by prominent polytheistic sects, such as
Hinduism, as well as nontheistic religions, such as Buddhism."2 5
Second, within the religions that accept the Ten Commandments,
"different religions and even different denominations within a particular faith" 251 subscribe to "distinctive versions" of it. 252 The state of
Texas necessarily chose to prioritize one particular version of the
Decalogue by displaying it on a monument. In fact, one purpose of
the monument display was proselytization, to guide youth by inspiring "renewed respect for the law of God., 253 Finally, Stevens concluded by emphasizing that the governmental display of the Ten
Commandments would undermine political equality by promoting religiously-inspired political divisiveness.
Recognizing the diversity of religious and secular beliefs held
by Texans and by all Americans, it seems beyond peradventure that
allowing the seat of government to serve as a stage for the propagation of an unmistakably Judeo-Christian message of piety would have
the tendency to make nonmonotheists and nonbelievers "feel like
[outsiders] in matters of faith, and [strangers] in the political community." "[D]isplays of this kind inevitably have a greater tendency to
emphasize sincere and deeply felt differences among individuals than
to achieve an ecumenical goal. 25 4
In McCreary, invalidating displays of the Ten Commandments in county courthouses, 255 Scalia's dissent candidly admitted
that such a public display acknowledges a governmental preference
for certain religions (monotheistic ones) over other religions (polythethe Ten Commandments. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 894
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
250. 545 U.S. at 719 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 717.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 715
254. Id. at 720-21 (quoting Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,
515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995)); Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 651 (1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In his Van Orden concurrence, Breyer mentioned the importance of avoiding religiously-inspired political
divisiveness. 545 U.S. at 698, 704 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
255. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
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istic ones).
From Scalia's viewpoint, however, the Constitution allows the government to grant its imprimatur to certain religions."'
Equality be damned!
IV. CONCLUSION

Richard W. Garnett and Noah Feldman both argue that, at
least when it comes to adjudication, Americans should accept religiously-inspired political divisiveness. They fret that the judicial enforcement of political equality pursuant to the establishment clausethe judicial proscription of governmental actions that would engender
religiously-inspired political divisiveness-would lead to unacceptable consequences. 258 Establishment-clause doctrine would become
skewed and produce outlandish case results. Concerns about political
divisiveness might be "real and reasonable,, 259 Garnett admits, but
that "does not mean that they can or should supply the enforceable
content of the First Amendment's prohibition on establishments of religion." 260 Basically, Garnett and Feldman suggest that religious minorities should develop tougher skins and stop being so sensitive.
261
Does it really hurt to gaze at a governmental display of a creche?
Well, yes, it does, as this Article has shown. The political
theory of pluralist democracy, the social science research documenting the power of religious identity, and the history of religious discrimination in the United States demonstrate that the importation of
religious divisions into the political realm can thwart the pluralist democratic process. Without political equality, pluralist democracy
does not exist. To be sure, republican democracy differed: an ostensible lack of civic virtue supposedly justified imposing inequality.
But pluralist democracy demands that each and every citizen be af256. Id. at 892-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 893 ("With respect to public acknowledgment of religious belief, it
is entirely clear from our Nation's historical practices that the Establishment Clause
permits this disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it
permits the disregard of devout atheists.").
258. See Feldman, From Liberty, supra note 21, at 718-30.

259. Garnett, supra note 27, at 1670.
260. Id.
261. FELDMAN,

DIVIDED,

supra note 19, at 240.
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forded a full and fair opportunity to participate, to assert his or her interests and values in the democratic arena. Citizens, then, must be
willing to negotiate and compromise with other citizens, who are
equally entitled to assert their interests and values. But religiouslyinspired political positions sometimes cannot be compromised; they
are absolutes. Moreover, when political stances form around religious orientations, religious outsiders inevitably lose merely because
they are minorities. Throughout American history, dominant religious groups have translated their values into political goals and imposed them on minorities when given the opportunity to do so. Relig262
iously-inspired political divisiveness produces political inequality.
Consequently, the Court should interpret the Establishment
Clause to promote political equality and to protect religious minorities
from the ravages wrought by religiously-inspired political divisiveness. But, to return to the 2008 presidential campaign, discussed at
the outset of this Article, would the political divisiveness component
of the entanglements prong prevent Mike Huckabee from reminding

262. Noah Feldman argues that the original purpose of the Establishment
Clause was to protect liberty of conscience. From a practical standpoint, the Establishment Clause thus precluded the government from providing financial support for religion. See FELDMAN, DIVIDED, supra note 19, at 19-56; Feldman, From
Liberty, supra note 21, at 679-84. While I agree with much of Feldman's historical narrative, he nonetheless makes several crucial errors. First, at the time of the
framing, liberty of conscience was more central to free exercise than to disestablishment. Disestablishment arose primarily from a political reality: no single religious denomination or sect wielded sufficient power to demand governmental
support. There were so many competing religions that disestablishment seemed to
be a reasonable stalemate (and this fact led to the gradual disestablishment of state
churches, as well). See FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T, supra note 2, at 139-41, 148-62.
Second, Noah Feldman whitewashes liberty of conscience. To the framing generation, liberty of conscience (and free exercise) did not connote a freedom to pursue any religious path whatsoever. Rather, liberty of conscience was a Protestant
doctrine that denoted a freedom to follow the truth of Christ. Id. at 55-56, 65-66,
147-48, 155-56, 164-69. Thus, Noah Feldman twists the history of the framing
period so that it better fits the religiously diverse nation that the United States has
become. Third, while Noah Feldman surreptitiously skews the history of the framing period, he disregards the historical transition from republican to pluralist democracy. See FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 29. Hence, in turn, he disregards the implications that the transition to pluralist democracy has for judicial
interpretations of the establishment clause.
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voters that he is the Christian candidate and that Mitt Romney is
Mormon? Would it prevent a large percentage of Americans from refusing to vote for a Mormon presidential candidate? Certainly not.
Supreme Court doctrine does not control American social attitudes
and relations. When Barack Obama won the Democratic nomination,
we predictably heard more rumors suggesting that he is truly Muslim
and attended a radical Islamic school as a child.263 The Court and its
establishment-clause proclamations were beside the point, especially
when polls showed that between forty-five and fifty-four percent of
Americans either would not vote for a Muslim presidential candidate
or would be less likely to do so (but apparently enough Americans
voted for Obama to elect him president).2
Even so, the Court can and should preclude the government
from encouraging such divisiveness, and the political-divisiveness
component of the entanglements prong provides a mechanism for doing so. Would entanglements cases sometimes lead to doctrinal difficulties, as Garnett and Noah Feldman worry? My recommended applications of the political-divisiveness proscription-prohibiting most
governmental funding of religious activities and institutions and most
governmental displays of religious symbols-would be relatively
straightforward. But wouldn't some cases be problematic, leading
some justices to parse the factual minutiae? Would a governmentally
displayed Christmas tree, for instance, be a prohibited religious symbol?
Undoubtedly, some political-divisiveness issues would lead to
hard cases, but vexing cases are the norm in constitutional law. We
should agonize less about the niceties of doctrine and the lucidity of
case outcomes and despair more about the ramifications of relig263. Nicholas D. Kristof, The Push to 'Otherize' Obama, New York Times,
Sept. 21, 2008 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/2l/opinion/21 kristof.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2008); see generally Perry Bacon, Jr., Foes Use Obama's Muslim Ties
to Fuel Rumors About Him, WASH,. POST., Nov. 29, 2007 available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/28/AR2007112
802757.html; CNN Debunks False Report About Obama, CNN.com, Jan. 23, 2007

http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/01/22/obama.madrassa/;

Jack Wheeler, The

Audacity of Apostasy: Barack Obama's Muslim Links, BrookesNews.com, Jan. 8,
2007 http://www.brookesnews.com/070801 obama.html.
264. Berkes, supra note 5.
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iously-inspired political divisiveness in the pluralist democratic process.

